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Angelocci: KSR v. Teleflex: Obvious Ambiguity

KSR V. TELEFLEX: OBVIOUS AMBIGUITY
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the United States Supreme Court decided KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. At issue in the case was the
standard for determining whether a patent is invalid because it was
obvious.' Specifically, the Court evaluated the current approach
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
and whether that approach was consistent with Supreme Court
precedent regarding obviousness. 2 The court held, in a unanimous
decision, that the Federal Circuit "analyzed the issue in a narrow,
rigid manner inconsistent with [Section 103 of the Patent Act] and
[the Supreme Court's] precedents." 3 The decision to reverse the
Federal Circuit's application of the teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine test was in error. The Court failed to
suggest an alternate test or provide guidance to the lower courts for
determining the question of obviousness, instead providing for
future ambiguity in determining the obviousness question.
II.BACKGROUND

The United States Patent Act (Patent Act) forbids issuance of a
patent if the invention was obvious.4

The requirement of non-

obviousness is found in Section 103 of the Patent Act which states,
in part:
A patent may not be obtained ...

if the differences

between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
1. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007).

2. Id.
3. Id. at 1746.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
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whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art ....
The Supreme Court previously considered the obviousness
question in the 1966 case of Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City. In that case the Court created an objective standard,
consisting of basic
factual inquiries, for evaluating whether a
6
obvious:
is
patent
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art
are to be determined; differences between the prior
art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined. Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs,
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented .
The Court subsequently acknowledged that applying the test
would be difficult and not unlike questions of negligence or
scienter.8 The Court then stated that it believed strict observance
9
of the test would lead to "uniformity and definiteness."
The result of Graham was far from the desired uniformity and
definiteness desired. In response to the difficulty of applying the
Graham test, the Federal Circuit created the "teaching, suggestion,
or motivation to combine" (TSM) test. 0 The Federal Circuit
stated that a party seeking patent invalidity must show some
motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings, which

5. Id.
6. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).

7. Id.
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id.
10. See AI-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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generally arises in the prior art references themselves, or may be
inferred from the nature of the problem to be solved or from the
knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. 11 It is this test that
the court evaluated and found too narrow and rigid in KSR.
Further description of the TSM test is necessary.
The
requirement of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
the prior art at the time of the invention protects against the entry
of hindsight into the obviousness analysis.' 2 To reach a nonhindsight conclusion regarding whether a person having ordinary
skill in the art at the time of invention would have viewed the
subject matter as a whole to be obvious, the reviewing party must
provide some "rationale, articulation, or reasoned basis to explain
why a conclusion of obviousness is correct."' 3 This helps ensure
predictable patent determinations.1 4 A suggestion, teaching, or
motivation to combine the relevant prior art teachings does not
have to be found explicitly in the prior art.' 5 The teaching,
motivation, or suggestion may be implicit in the prior art as a
whole. 16 The test for an implicit showing is what the combined
teachings, knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and the
nature of the problem to be solved as a whole would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.' 7 But rejections
cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness. 18 This requirement is
rooted in the Administrative
Procedure Act, which ensures non9
arbitrary decision making.'
A. KSR v. Teleflex ProceduralHistory
Teleflex owned the exclusive license for a patent covering a
mechanism for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 987 (citing In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 987-988 (citing Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1370).
Khan, 441 F.3d at 988.
Id.
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automobile pedal so the pedal's position could be transmitted to2 0a
computer that controlled the throttle in the vehicle's engine.
KSR, a competitor of Teleflex, added an electronic sensor to a
pedal that KSR previously designed. 2 '

Teleflex sued KSR for patent infringement.
In response, KSR
23
In its
filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity.
motion, KSR alleged that it would have been obvious to someone
with ordinary skill in the art of designing pedal systems to
combine an adjustable pedal system with an electronic pedal
24
position sensor to work with electronically controlled engines.
The district court evaluated the obviousness question by using the
basic factual inquiries set forth in Graham.2 5 After evaluating six
sources of prior art, the level of the ordinary skill in the art, and the
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, the
district court determined that the prior art taught the invention at
issue, but then added that the invention would only be obvious if
there was "some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art
teachings. ' ' 26 The district court found that the incentive to
combine arose from the nature of the problem to be solved, and the
27
prior art references related to the art of vehicle pedal systems.
Finally, the district court evaluated the secondary considerations
mandated by Graham and found that whatever commercial success
existed was insufficient to overcome KSR's clear and convincing
evidence of obviousness. 28 The district court, therefore, granted
KSR's motion for summary judgment of invalidity.
The Federal Circuit, however, did not agree with the district
court's determination that the invention was obvious and vacated
the district court's grant of summary judgment. 2 9 The Federal
Circuit held that the district court had not been strict enough in

20. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007).
21. Id.
22. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581 (E.D. Mich. 2003).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 583.
Id.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.

28. Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
29. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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applying the TSM test. 30 The Federal Circuit faulted the district
court for failing to make findings as to the specific understanding
or principle of a skilled artisan that would have motivated the
combination. 3 1 Additionally, the nature of the problem to be
solved could not be used unless the prior art specifically
32
referenced the precise problem the patentee was trying to solve.
Because the prior art relied on by the district court in its finding of
obviousness was designed to solve different problems, the Federal
Circuit held that the art would not have led a person skilled in the
art to combine the references.3 3 Additionally, the Federal Circuit
rejected the determination that the combination would have been
obvious to try because ' "obvious
to try has long been held not to
34
obviousness."
constitute
B. KSR v. Teleflex Supreme Court Opinion
Justice Kennedy delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court.35 After describing the technology at issue, the facts of the
case, and the procedural history, Kennedy rejected the approach of
the Federal Circuit. 36
Kennedy stressed the need for an
"expansive and flexible" approach while reiterating Graham's
requirement of "uniformity and definiteness. 3 7 Kennedy stated
that the Court's decision in Graham reaffirmed the need for a
"functional approach" in considering obviousness.3 8 Therefore,
Kennedy stated, Graham set forth the requirement of a broad
39
inquiry.
Kennedy continued to describe its precedent regarding the
obviousness inquiry: "Neither the enactment of section 103 nor the
analysis of Graham disturbed [the] Court's earlier instructions
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

34. Id. at 289.
35. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1727 (2007).
36. Id. at 1739 ("We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of
Appeals.").

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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concerning the need for caution in granting a patent
based on the
40
art."
prior
the
in
found
elements
of
combination
Kennedy then described three post-Graham cases to illustrate
whether a combination is obvious. 4 ' When a patent claims a
structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere
substitution of one element for another, the combination must do
more than yield a predictable result. 42 However, when the prior

art teaches away from combining certain known elements,
discovery of a successful combination is likely to be nonobvious.43 While the combination of old elements may perform a
useful function, the elements must do more than operate as
expected. 4 When a patent simply arranges old elements with each
performing the same function it had been known to perform and
yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement,
the combination is obvious.45 Kennedy summarized that a court
must ask whether the improvement is more than a predictable use
of prior art elements according to their established functions.46
Kennedy pointed out that it isn't always as easy as simple
substitution:
Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to
interrelated teachings of multiple patents; the
effects of demands known to the design community
or present in the marketplace; and the background
knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary
skill in the art, all in order to determine whether
there was an apparent reason to combine the known
elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at
40. Id. A "patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no
change in their respective functions ... obviously withdraws what is already

known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to
skillful men." Id. (citing Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)).
41. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739-40.
42. Id. at 1740 (citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966)).
43. Id. (citing Adams, 383 U.S. at 51-52).
44. Id. (citing Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396
U.S. 57, 60-62 (1969)).
45. Id. (citing Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)).
46. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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47

Kennedy further required that this analysis be made explicit in
order to facilitate appellate review. 48 But Kennedy again made
sure to point out that precise teachings to the specific invention are
not necessary, and the inferences and creative steps taken by a
skilled artisan would suffice. 4 9
Kennedy next stated that the requirement of a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine to show obviousness was a
helpful insight. 50 While a patent is not obvious just because it is a
combination of known elements, it is important to identify a reason
that would have led a skilled artisan to combine them to show that
the invention was obvious. 5 1 "Helpful insights, however, need not
become rigid and mandatory formulas.' 52 Kennedy pointed out
that the TSM test was not necessarily at odds with Supreme Court
precedent, but that making
it a rigid rule impermissibly limits the
53
obviousness inquiry.
Kennedy was concerned with the narrow conception of the
obviousness analysis used by the Federal Circuit in this case.54 He
set out the issue simply: if "there existed at the time of invention a
known problem for which there was an obvious solution
encompassed by the patent's claims," then a patent claim is
invalid.55 This is an objective standard.56
Kennedy pointed out that the Federal Circuit's first error was
ignoring that simple question by focusing only on the problem the
particular patentee was trying to solve and ignoring the objective
requirement. 57 Any need or problem existing in the field at the
time of the invention that is addressed by the patent is a sufficient

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740-41.
Id. at 1741.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
Id.
Id.at 1742.
Id.
Id.
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58
reason for combining known elements.
The second error of the Federal Circuit, according to Kennedy,
was that a skilled artisan would only be drawn to prior art that set
59
out to solve the identical problem the artisan was trying to solve.
"Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have
obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a
person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle." 60 People are creative, not
"automatons. 61
Additionally, Kennedy did not agree with the Federal Circuit's
conclusion that an invention cannot be obvious by showing that it
was obvious to try.62 When faced with a problem, skilled artisans
will pursue all options within their ability, and if this leads to
not of innovation but of ordinary
success, "it is likely the product
63
skill and common sense."
Kennedy acknowledged the risk of hindsight bias in the obvious
inquiry as well, but was unwilling to support "rigid preventative
64
rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense."
Finally, Kennedy did not consider a broader TSM test applied
in KSR because those
by the Federal Circuit after its decision
65
decisions were not before the Court.

C. Application of Law to the Facts of the Case
Computer controlled throttles require an electronic sensor to
translate the mechanical operation of the accelerator pedal to
digital data. 66 Traditional mechanical pedals can be pushed down
but could not be adjusted forward or back to accommodate drivers
or varying height. 67 As a result, pedals were invented that solved

58. Id.
59. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1743.
65. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1743.
66. Id. at 1735.
67. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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this problem. 68 In 1989, the Asano patent invented a support
structure that allowed for adjusting the pedal relative to the driver
while leaving one of the pedal's pivot points fixed.69 In 1993, the
Redding patent created a sliding mechanism that adjusted both the
pedal and the pivot point.7°
In 1991, an invention .disclosed that, for electronic sensors, it
was preferable to detect the pedal position in the pedal as opposed
to in the engine. 7 ' In 1990, the Smith patent taught that to prevent
wire chafing, the sensor should be placed on a fixed part of the
pedal assembly rather than in or on the pedal's footpad.72 In 1992,
an invention disclosed a modular sensor that could be added to a
mechanical pedal.73 In 1994, Chevrolet sold a line of trucks with
modular sensors attached to pedal support brackets.74 In 1995, the
Rixon patent disclosed an adjustable pedal assembly with an
electronic sensor;75 however, this invention suffered from a wire
chafing problem.
In 1998, Ford Motor Company hired KSR to supply an
adjustable mechanical pedal, and KSR obtained a patent for this
adjustable pedal design in 1999.76 In 2000, General Motors hired
KSR to supply an adjustable pedal for use with computer actuated
throttles.77 To satisfy General Motor's requirements, KSR simply
added a modular sensor to its 1999 invention originally developed
for Ford. 78
Teleflex owns the exclusive license to the Engelglau patent,
which was invented on February 14, 1998. 79 The invention
discloses a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic
pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
KSR,
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
KSR,
Id.
Id.

127 S. Ct. at 1735.
1735-36.
1736.

127 S. Ct. at 1736.
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assembly.80 Attaching the sensor to the support member allows
the sensor to remain in a fixed position while the driver adjusts the
pedal.8 The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
allowed this invention because it included a fixed pivot point, and
the only prior art reviewed by the office were the inventions of
Redding (adjustable pedal) and Smith (mounting of sensor on
pedal support structure).8 2 The
Asano invention was not included
83
in the patent office's review.
Kennedy concluded that the district court was correct in its
holding that at the time of Engelglau's invention, it was obvious
for a person skilled in the art to combine the Asano invention with
a pivot mounted pedal position sensor.8 4 This was because the
market created a strong incentive to convert mechanical pedals
such as Asano for use with computer controlled throttles, and the
prior art taught multiple ways of achieving this. 85 Kennedy stated
that the Federal Circuit analyzed the problem too narrowly by
asking whether a designer would have chosen both the Asano
pedal and a modular sensor similar to those used in the Chevy
truckline of 1994 and concluding that the artisan would not.86 The
district court asked the same question, but came to the correct
87
conclusion that the artisan would have chosen to combine them.
Kennedy presented the question differently: "whether a pedal
designer of ordinary skill, facing the wide range of needs created
by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen a
' 88
benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor."
Kennedy emphasized that, in design, changing one component
will often lead to changing others, and modifying existing designs
to solve new problems is common. 89 If a designer was starting
with the Asano pedal with the need to upgrade it to work with
computer controlled throttles, the question for the designer would
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1737.
83. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1737.
84. Id. at 1744.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

89. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1744.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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be where to attach the sensor. 90 The '936 patent taught placing the
sensor on the pedal rather than in the engine. 9 1 Smith disclosed
placement on the support structure rather than on the pedal itself. 92
Because of the Rixon patent's known wire chafing problems, a
designer would know to place the sensor on a nonmoving part of
the support structure. 93 Smith chose to mount the sensor on a
a designer would likely place the sensor on the
pivot point, so
94
pivot as well.
The Court also approached the question by starting with an
invention with a known problem, such as Rixon, and fixing it. 9 5 In
that situation, a designer would know from the Smith patent to
would be led to Asano, which
avoid sensor movement and
96
point.
pivot
fixed
a
contained
The Court dismissed the argument that the prior art taught away
from combining Asano with a modular sensor because the
combination would not have solved the problem intended to be
Engelglau desired a small, simple,
solved by Engelglau. 97
98
inexpensive pedal. Asano was bulky, complex, and expensive. 99
But Teleflex failed to show that there would be no reason to
upgrade Asano. 100 Judging Asano against Engelglau "would be to
engage in the very hindsight bias Teleflex rightly urges must be
avoided."' '
The Court also stated, briefly, that the presumption of validity
to the failure to
granted to issued patents seemed diminished due 02
disclose Asano to the USPTO during prosecution. 1

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1744-45.
95. KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1745.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1745.
102. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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III. ANALYSIS

A. Kennedy Was Inconsistent When He Rejected the TSM Test
While Recognizing the Needfor Uniformity andDefiniteness.
The Supreme Court erred when it rejected the approach of the
Federal Circuit and further erred when it failed to provide an
alternative test or give guidance for determining the obviousness
question. When Justice Kennedy began the analysis of the Federal
Circuit decision "by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of
Appeals [for the Federal Circuit,]" he seemingly signaled the
creation of a new test or approach. 0 3 This new test or approach
never came. Kennedy emphasized the Supreme Court's past
10 4
jurisprudence requiring an expansive and flexible approach.
However, Supreme Court precedent is far from clear when it
comes to the malleability of the obviousness inquiry. Kennedy
reiterated that "Graham recognized the need for 'uniformity and
definiteness." ' 0 5 But the rigid approach of the Federal Circuit
made the obviousness inquiry uniform and definite. Kennedy
justified his departure from this need for uniformity and
definiteness by stating that, while Graham recognized the need for
such a standard, "Graham reaffirmed the 'functional approach' of
Hotchkiss."' 106 Kennedy stated that instead of appealing to the
stated need for uniformity and definiteness and in light of
Graham's affirmation of the functional approach, Graham
ultimately "set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where
appropriate, to look at secondary considerations that would prove
instructive."'' 0 7
Kennedy's reliance on both the need for
uniformity and definiteness and the need for a functional approach
is puzzling and makes clear that uniformity and definiteness are
not necessarily as important as previously believed.

103. Id. at 1739.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1739 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1,
18 (1966)).
106. Id. at 1739 (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 12).
107. KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1739 (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 17).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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Kennedy Over-Simplified the Obviousness Question in Order
to Reject the TSM Test.

Kennedy relies on previous Supreme Court cases that illustrated
the Court's previous mandate "for caution in granting a patent
based on the combination of elements found in the prior art."'°8 In
1950, prior to Graham, the Court held that a "patent for a
combination which only unites old elements with no change in
their respective functions" takes something previously known to
the public and impermissibly grants an exclusive right to the
patentee for this publicly known technology. 09 To be sure, when
this is the case, a patent should not issue. But it is not always as
simple as denying a patent that combines known elements.
Denying patents under such a "rigid" rule would go against
Kennedy's earlier declaration for a "functional approach." To do
so would remove incentive for an inventor to try new
combinations of known elements to solve a new problem. Clearly,
a rule such as the one highlighted by Kennedy would require an
exception. Kennedy illustrates this exception by pointing out the
companion case to Graham. In United States v. Adams, an
inventor substituted water for acids in a new battery and used a
different type of electrode. 110 Clearly a combination of known
elements, the Court still found the patent was not obvious because
the prior art taught "away from combining certain known
elements" and therefore "discovery of a successful means of
combining them is more likely to be non-obvious.""' Because the
prior art warned of the risks involved in using the types of
electrodes in the invention, the invention was not obvious. This
conclusion, not surprisingly, would have occurred under the TSM
test as well. The prior art of Adams, by teaching away from such a
combination, inherently did not contain a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine these elements.
However, Kennedy continued to stress the Court's previous
conclusion that combinations of known elements are not
108. Id. at 1739.
109. See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 152 (1950).
110. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40 (1966).
111. Id. at 51-52.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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patentable. Kennedy illustrated two post-Graham cases where the
court found inventions to be obvious combinations of known
elements. By focusing on these post-Graham cases illustrating an
obvious combination, Kennedy buried the exception illustrated in
Adams, a conclusion that would have been reached using the TSM
test, with overly-simplistic cases that cater to Kennedy's anti-TSM
bias. In 1969, the Court rejected a patent that combined a radiant
heat burner and a paving machine."l 2 In 1976, the Court rejected a
patent that "simply [arranged] old elements with each performing
the same function it had been known to perform."' 1 3 These cases
add very little in determining whether the TSM test is sufficient to
determine the obviousness question. They illustrate nothing more
than stating that the combination of a toothbrush and toothpaste is
obvious. To reach such a conclusion, the wisdom of the Supreme
Court is not necessary. In both cases, the TSM test would have
found each invention obvious. There is clearly a motivation to
combine a heating element with a paving machine. Likewise, a
combination of elements contains an inherent motivation to rearrange them if it leads to a better result. A bookshelf organized
by author may be better arranged by title based on the needs of the
user. When motivated to do so, the user does not become entitled
to a patent on his new arrangement.
Kennedy conceded that the analysis may be more difficult than
in the cases he illustrated.1 1 4
This concession is an
understatement. Kennedy then supported his rejection of the TSM
test by highlighting the fact that the Court's precedent stated that
when performing the obviousness inquiry, the analysis "need not
seek out precise teachings" and that a "court can take into account
the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would employ."' 1 5 The fact that the Court has never
explicitly required investigation into whether the prior art
contained a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine does
not mean that this analysis is not within the Court's precedent.
Rather, it is quite possible that requiring a teaching, motivation, or
112. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 6062 (1969).
113. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
114. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007).
115. Id. at 1741.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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suggestion to combine is an effective tool to determine the obvious
question in a uniform and predictable manner.
Kennedy seemed to believe that the USPTO and courts
evaluating patent validity have an incentive to grant patents to
obvious inventions. However, a patent applicant goes through a
rigorous procedure with the USPTO while prosecuting his patent.
The USPTO, in an overwhelming majority of applications, initially
rejects a patent application as being anticipated by prior art or a
combination of prior art. If the USPTO ultimately grants a patent
after the patent prosecution process, the patent applicant has
proven to the USPTO that the invention was not obvious. Patent
examiners spend their entire day evaluating a particular class of
inventions and have a very broad knowledge of the prior art related
to an invention. For this reason, there is a presumption of validity
given to patents that have been issued by the USPTO. The TSM
test is useful in assuring that the invention is not invalidated by the
courts due to hindsight bias. When the finder of fact looks at a
patented invention and sees the solution, and then sees the prior
art, it is easier to think that the invention was obvious.
C. Kennedy Failedto Adequately Show That the TSM Test Was
Inconsistentwith Supreme Court Precedent.
Kennedy again spoke of the TSM test in a positive light while
concurrently rejecting the test when he stated that the Federal
Circuit captured a helpful insight when requiring the
demonstration of a teaching suggestion, or motivation to combine
known elements in order to show an invention was obvious. 116
Kennedy agreed that it was important to identify a reason that
would have prompted an inventor to combine the elements in the
claimed way. 117 He was correct when he stated that most if not all
inventions are combinations of what is already known. 118 But
again, he discarded the helpful insight and uniformity of the test
because it was too "rigid." Kennedy's flat out rejection of the
TSM test is equally as rigid. Contradicting himself once again,
Kennedy admitted that there was "no necessary inconsistency
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham
analysis. 119 Explaining this contradiction, Kennedy complained
that when the general principle of Graham is transformed to a rigid
However, the
test, it limits the obviousness inquiry.12
presumption of validity granted to issued patents and future
predictability necessitates limiting the inquiry, much like the when
the Court limits its inquiry into issues of law before them to the
questions presented.
Why the Court pretends to avoid
overstepping its mandate in one situation while clearly doing so in
another is confusing. It appears that this case would have been
better evaluated as an as-applied challenge than as a review of the
TSM test itself.
Kennedy was correct when he stated that if the patented claim
extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under section 103.121 In
simple terms, Kennedy stated that "[o]ne of the ways in which a
patent's subject matter can be proved obvious is by noting that
there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which
there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent's
claims." 122
Kennedy was incorrect, however, when he criticized the Federal
Circuit for focusing on the problem that the inventor was trying to
solve.' 23 Kennedy's opinion-that the court should look to all
problems that could be solved by the patent's subject matter, and
whether the solution was obvious to a person with ordinary skill in
the art-fails to take into account the common sense that Kennedy
made clear was so important. A person having ordinary skill in the
art cannot imagine every problem in his field. The specific
problem addressed by the patentee is a necessary component of the
obviousness inquiry because it is this very problem that leads to
the patentee's attempt to solve the problem with his invention. If a
court is to determine whether an invention is obvious, it needs to
put itself into the shoes of the inventor, and that includes focusing
on the specific problem faced by the inventor. Focusing on every
problem that could be solved by the subject matter is an example
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
Id. at 1742.
Id.
Id.
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of the danger of hindsight bias and is not grounded in the reality of
the inventive process.
Kennedy was likewise incorrect when he rejected the Federal
Circuit's assumption that a person having ordinary skill in the art
faced with a problem would be led only to those elements of prior
art designed to solve the same problem. 124 This requirement of the
Federal Circuit again protects against hindsight bias. Common
sense dictates that when a problem arises, an inventor will be led
to other solutions of similar problems. An objective person having
ordinary skill in the art will not randomly investigate technology
aimed at other problems. This does not mean that an inventor
would ignore prior art that addressed a different problem. If said
prior art appears useful to the new problem, an inventor would
obviously consider it. But it should not be assumed that a person
having ordinary skill in the art has knowledge of every possible
use of prior art that is primarily directed to a different problem.
Kennedy was correct, however, when he stated that the Federal
Circuit erred when it held that a patent cannot be proved obvious
by showing that a combination was obvious to try. 125 If there
exists a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to try a combination
when faced with a problem to solve, this is no different than
having a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to actually combine
prior art elements. The inventive process inherently involves trial
and error. Kennedy's criticism of the Federal Circuit in this regard
was correct, but has little weight other than adding to a list of
criticisms which makes a rejection of the Federal Circuit's
approach more plausible. If something is obvious to try and it
works, it is no longer a mere try.
It is the hypothetical
combination that is the subject of evaluation. Kennedy's criticism
is nothing more than a distinction without a difference.
Kennedy used the Federal Circuit's aversion to hindsight bias
against them when he equated the TSM test's protection from this
bias with a rigid rule preventing investigation into the obviousness
question. 126 The test is plainly necessary to protect against
hindsight bias. Kennedy claimed that the TSM test denies

124. See id.

125. Id.
126. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
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factfinders recourse to common sense.127 But Kennedy failed to
enumerate the ways in which the test does this. It appears
throughout the opinion that Kennedy thought common sense
would dictate that the combination of the adjustable pedal with a
modular sensor was obvious, based on his perception of common
sense. But a test based on a conclusory factor such as common
sense is not a test at all. The rigid rejection by Kennedy of the
TSM test opens the door for hindsight bias to rear its ugly head,
disguised by a conclusion that common sense dictates an invention
was obvious.
D. Kennedy Erred When He Failedto Considerthe Federal
Circuit'sBroaderConception of the TSM Test.
Kennedy's greatest failure in evaluating the Federal Circuit's
test for obviousness was his refusal to evaluate the broader
conception of the TSM test used by the Federal Circuit after it
decided the KSR case.' 28 Kennedy was correct that those
decisions were not before the Court and did not correct any error
of the Federal Circuit in deciding KSR. But in rejecting the
Federal Circuit's TSM test, Kennedy should have considered the
Federal Circuit's broader version of the TSM test. Given the
lengths Kennedy went to disparage the test created and modified
by the Federal Circuit, Kennedy should have reviewed and
discussed these opinions before concluding that the test was too
rigid to allow for adequate review of the obviousness question.
In DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H.
Patrick Co., the Federal Circuit clarified its TSM test. The Federal
Circuit made clear that the test "is in actuality quite flexible and
not only permits, but requires, consideration of common
knowledge and common sense."' 129 The Federal Circuit made
clear that in considering obviousness, a critical step is casting the
mind back to the time of invention, and "consider the thinking of
one of ordinary skill in the art, guided only by the prior art

127. Id. at 1742-43.
128. Id. at 1743.
129. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.,
464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (2006).
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references and the then accepted wisdom in the field."' 3 ° Further,
the Federal Circuit stated, "[h]aving established that this
knowledge was in the art, the examiner could then properly rely, as
put forth by the solicitor, on a conclusion of obviousness 'from
common knowledge and common sense of the person of ordinary
skill in the art without any specific hint or suggestion in a
particular reference."" 3' The Federal Circuit did not stop there. It
continued to explain the possibility of an implicit motivation to
combine. 132 When an improvement is technology independent and
the combination of references results in a product or process that is
more desirable, for example more efficient or more durable, the
desire to improve the product is universal and "common-sensical,"
and the Federal Circuit determined that "there exists in these
situations a motivation to combine prior art references33even absent
any hint of suggestion in the references themselves." 1
Kennedy further failed to consider the Federal Circuit's
explanation of its test from Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc. The
Federal Circuit stated plainly: "A suggestion, teaching, or
motivation to combine the relevant prior art teachings does not
have to be found explicitly in the prior art."134 "The teaching,
motivation, or suggestion may be implicit from the prior art as135a
whole, rather than expressly stated in the references."
"Rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere
conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness."' 136 Kennedy's rejection of the TSM
test and reliance on common sense opens the door for these
conclusory statements.
If these decisions had been considered more fully by the Court,
it is possible that the TSM test would not have been disparaged as
badly by Kennedy. In fact, Kennedy would have not been able to

130. Id. at 1368 (citing In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed.Cir.2000)).
131. Id. (citing In re Bozek, 416 F.2d 1385, 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (2006) (emphasis
in original).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1291 (emphasis in original).
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criticize the test as "rigid" and would have had to acknowledge the
possibility that the TSM test included a common sense component
as well as the fact that an explicit teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine prior art references was not necessary.
Kennedy attempted to justify the failure to consider these cases
because they were not before the Court.1 37 He then attempted to
mitigate the effect of his opinion on the TSM test by stating that
the extent to which the decisions in DyStar and Alza "may describe
an analysis more consistent with our earlier precedents and our
decision here is a matter for the Court of Appeals to consider in its
future cases."' 38 But when Kennedy devoted much of his opinion
to criticizing the Federal Circuit's test, it is irresponsible to refuse
to consider the test in light of those decisions. Kennedy left open
the ability for the Federal Circuit to apply its TSM test in the
future so long as it conforms to the mandate of KSR. But the
opinion reads more like a condemnation of the TSM test than a
mistake by the Federal Circuit in applying its test. The Federal
Circuit, in light of this decision, is unlikely to attempt to use the
TSM test again, though it appears the TSM test was well within
existing Supreme Court precedent.
E. Kennedy Failedto Comply with His Own Mandate When He
Applied the Law to the Facts of the Case.
After rejecting the TSM test, Kennedy proceeded to evaluate the
invention using an approach that is far from uniform and
functional. While the Federal Circuit asked whether an objective
inventor faced with the same problem would have chosen both the
Asano pedal and the modular sensor, Kennedy instead asked
whether a pedal designer, faced with "the wide range of needs
created by developments in the field of endeavor, would have seen
a benefit to upgrading Asano with a sensor.' 139 This analysis begs
the question. Kennedy essentially asked whether a designer
starting with the invention would have noticed the invention. The
inventive process involves the discovery of a problem and
imagining a solution. Kennedy hands the hypothetical inventor the
137. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1743 (2007).

138. Id.
139. Id. at 1744.
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solution and asks whether it can solve the problem. This is exactly
the kind of hindsight bias that the TSM test protects against.
Simply stating that one has not fallen prey to hindsight bias
doesn't make it true. Of particular note is the fact that during the
prosecution of the patent in the PTO, the Asano patent was not
discovered. If it was so obvious to upgrade Asano, either the
Asano inventors would have tried upgrading it already, or others in
the field would have found Asano when looking for a solution.
This is not to say that finding the invention obvious was an
incorrect conclusion. However, Kennedy's analysis destroys any
predictability when determining the obviousness question and
makes issued patents subject to future invalidity. The Federal
Circuit said as much in a footnote of the aforementioned DyStar
case. The footnote reads:
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in a case involving this court's
application of the suggestion test. In KSR, we
vacated a district court's grant of summary
judgment of invalidity for obviousness. The district
court found a motivation to combine not in the
references but "largely on the nature of the problem
to be solved", which we did not deem erroneous.
Rather, we vacated because the court did not
explain sufficiently its rationale, and failed to make
"findings as to the specific understanding or
principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan
that would have motivated one with no knowledge
of [the] invention to make the combination in the
40
manner claimed." 1
This is an important point that should not be taken lightly.
Kennedy focused too much on the invention in front of him and
whether it was obvious to combine all of the references before
him. The hindsight is blinding. Kennedy ignored the rationale
behind the Federal Circuit's decision to vacate the district court's
grant of summary judgment. The Federal Circuit did not vacate
140. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co.,
464 F.3d 1356, 1367 n.3 (2006).
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because there was no explicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation
to combine. Rather, they vacated because the district court failed
to point out the rationale behind its conclusion that the teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine was implicit.
The theme of Kennedy's opinion is one of overreaction and
overreaching in condemning the TSM test. Kennedy relied on the
ambiguous Supreme Court precedent of Graham in finding the
Federal Circuit's test to be too rigid in application. But the test is
not too rigid. It is a functional and predictable test, open to
flexibility in determining the question of obviousness. All the
Federal Circuit asks is for a court to point out why a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine is implicit in the problem to
be solved. The Federal Circuit does not demand that it exist
explicitly.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

The rejection by the Supreme Court of the Federal Circuit's
application of the TSM test in KSR is certain to cause a change in
the way that the industry handles the obviousness question. How
it affects actual practice, though, is far from predictable. What is
certain, however, is that there is less predictability for inventors
and patent attorneys when evaluating whether an invention will be
considered non-obvious and patentable or, instead, obvious and
un-patentable.
A. The Increased UncertaintyRegardingPatentabilityWill
Cause a Decrease in Innovation and a Decrease in Patent
Applications
The number of patent applications filed in the USPTO is
increasing yearly.' 4' For instance, from 2004-2006, patent
applications of US origin filed with the patent office were
42
approximately 189,000, 207,000 and 221,000 respectively.
However, the number of patents granted does not necessarily

141. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us-stat.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
142. Id.
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correlate. 143 In 2004, 84,000 patents were granted. 14 4 In 2005,
74,000 were granted. 145 In 2006, 90,000 were granted. 146 This
indicates that it is far from predictable that a patent will issue when
an inventor applies for patent protection. This further shows that
the patent office does not easily grant patents to applicants. It is a
rigorous process that costs thousands of dollars to an inventor
because of filing fees and attorney's fees. Even a moderately
complex invention can cost the inventor between $9,000 and
$12,000, with a highly complex invention costing upwards of
$25,000. 147 The TSM test gave inventors and patent attorneys a
predictable and workable test for evaluating whether to pursue a
patent for certain inventions. However, given the uncertainty
caused by the Supreme Court's opinion, it appears likely that
inventors may be hesitant to invest their money in the process.
One of the purposes of the patent system is "[t]o promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." 148 When the chance of getting a patent
is unclear, the inventor has less incentive to create a new
invention. It may be difficult to predict with certainty the extent to
which the decreased incentive stunts creativity because of the
constant increase of patent applications every year. However, as is
the case with any investment, the higher the risk in the investment,
the less valuable it becomes to the risk taker.
B. The USPTO No Longer Requires PatentExaminers to
Articulate a Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation to Combine
When Concluding a Patent is Obvious
An obvious corollary to the added uncertainty of the ability to
obtain a patent is the fact that the USPTO is likely to grant fewer
patents as a result of the decision. No longer bound by the
143. Id.
144. Id.

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. IP Watchdog, Cost of Obtaining a Patent, http://www.ipwatchdog.com
/patent-cost.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
148. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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requirement of articulating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine when concluding that a patent is obvious, patent
examiners can rely on hindsight bias as well as their bias for not
granting a patent in their decision to reject a patent application.
An examiner can point to prior art and state simply that it would
have been obvious to combine multiple references. Without a
requirement to articulate a reason for why it is obvious, other than
common sense, it will be difficult for an inventor to argue that the
examiner is mistaken.
On October 10, 2007, the USPTO issued guidelines for patent
examiners when determining the obviousness question in light of
KSR. 149 The patent examiner is instructed to engage in the factual
inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere: (1) Determine the
scope and content of the prior art; (2) Ascertain the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (3) Resolve
the level of ordinary skill in the art.' 50 Additionally, the examiner
should evaluate objective evidence or "secondary considerations"
such as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure
of others, and unexpected results. ' 51 "The question of obviousness
must be resolved on the basis of these factual inquiries."' 152 These
factual inquiries are broadly worded and allow for various
conclusions by different examiners.
The USPTO includes
guidance for performing these factual inquiries. For determining
the scope and content of the prior art, the USPTO suggests
determining the broadest scope possible.' 53 Further, the USPTO
suggests a search should cover "the claimed subject matter, and
should also cover the disclosed features which might reasonably be
expected to be claimed."' 5 4 The USPTO then states that a
rejection need not be based on a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine, but if the search finds one, that would be
preferred. 155 This shows the effect of the decision on the patent
149. Patent and Trademark Office Examination Guidelines for Determining

Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103 in View of the Supreme Court Decision in
KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (Oct. 10, 2007).

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 57,527.

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 72 Fed. Reg. at 57,527.
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office. By allowing an examiner to proceed with rejecting the
patent for obviousness without locating a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine, the USPTO opens the door for the
examiner to fall prey to hindsight bias when considering the prior
art.
The USPTO also points out various rationales to support
rejections based on obviousness.' 56 In making an obviousness
rejection, the examiner does not need to locate a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine in the prior art. 157 Rather,
the examiner need only explain why the differences between the
invention and the prior art would have been obvious.' 58 Again, the
examiner is given a large amount of discretion in concluding an
invention is obvious. Further, neither the particular motivation to
make the claimed invention nor the problem the inventor was
trying to solve controls. The only question to the examiner is
whether the invention would have been obvious after considering
all of the facts. This theme of allowing an obviousness rejection
based on overall picture without requiring any evidence that the
invention was obvious, other than the examiners conclusion that it
was obvious, is troubling and likely to lead to inconsistent and
unpredictable rejections.
While the USPTO does not completely abandon the TSM test, it
does remove the requirement of using the test. The USPTO mildly
states "if the search of the prior art and the resolution of the
Graham factual inquiries reveal that an obviousness rejection can
be made using the TSM rationale, then such a rejection could be
made."' 159 However, without a finding such as this, there is still
nothing preventing a rejection from being made. As a result, the
TSM test becomes nothing more than one of many possible
rationales for rejecting an invention as being obvious. These other
rationales include: combining prior art elements according to
known methods to yield predictable results; simple substitution of
one known element for another; use of known techniques to
improve similar devices; applying a known technique to a known
device to ready for improvement to yield predictable results; and
156. Id. at 57,528.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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obvious to try. 160 These rationales appear to be nothing more than
conclusory statements about obviousness. Additionally, the use of
these rationales is not dependent on the TSM test no longer
existing. Each of them qualifies as a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine based on the prior art and the knowledge of
the inventor.
C.

The Supreme Court's Rejection of the TSM Test Will Result in
Inconsistent Decisions by the Lower Courts.

The Supreme Court's rejection of the Federal Circuit's
requirement for an articulated reason will have an effect on
litigation as well. Accused patent infringers can now allege
invalidity with a straight face because there is no longer a
requirement to articulate the reason for finding a patent obvious.
Without a clear test from the Supreme Court for the obviousness
inquiry, district courts will be able to operate bound only by their
own "common sense" and the Federal Circuit's constantly
evolving precedent in light of the Supreme Court's rejection of the
Federal Circuit's test. The risk of hindsight bias in these situations
is extremely high. The resulting inconsistency from various
district courts and little Federal Circuit precedent so far will lead to
the very problems that the creation of the Federal Circuit was
created to solve. The obviousness question will be applied based
on the common sense and conclusion of district court judges
across the country. Who is to say when something is common
sense and when it isn't?
D. The Federal CircuitHas Responded to the Supreme Court's
Rejection of the TSM by Creatinga New "Rigid" Test.
The Federal Circuit has attempted to bring consistency to
obvious inquiry in light of KSR when it considered the
obviousness question after the Supreme Court's decision. On
August 1, 2007, the Federal Circuit decided In re ICON Health
and Fitness, Inc. Icon initiated a reexamination proceeding while
in the midst of litigation against at least six defendants.' 6' The
160. Id.
161. Patently-O, Reasonable Pertinence may be Sufficient to Combine
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decision was an appeal by Icon from a decision by the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences during reexamination of Icon's
patent.162 The Board held that Icon's claims were unpatentable as
obvious. 163 Icon's invention consisted of a treadmill with a
folding base, allowing the base to swivel into an upright storage
position.1 64 Of note in the invention was a gas spring connected
between the tread base and the upright structure to assist in
retaining the treadmill base in the upright position.' 65 The
examiner rejected Icon's claims as obvious based on 66a
combination of a design by Damak and a design by Teague.'
Icon did not dispute that Damak contained all of the limitations of
Icon's invention other than the gas spring.' 67 The Teague
invention pertained to a bed that folded up into a cabinet or
recess. 168 Teague disclosed the use of a dual action spring that
essentially partially supports the weight of the bed in both the open
and closed positions. 169 The Federal Circuit rejected Icon's
argument that the Teague invention falls outside the treadmill art
and addresses a different problem. 170 The Federal Circuit stated
that if the art was reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by
Icon, then the prior art could serve as analogous art. 17 1 The
Federal Circuit defined prior art as reasonably pertinent if "it is
one which, because the matter with which it deals, logically would
have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering
the problem." 172 The court further stated that "the finding that
Teague, by addressing a similar problem, provides analogous art to
Icon's application goes a long way towards demonstrating a reason

References in Obviousness Rejection, http://www.patentlyo.com (Aug. 2, 2007).
162. In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. ICONHealthand Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1377.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1379.
Id.
Id. at 1379-80.
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to combine the two references."' 73 "Once the elements are shown
in reasonably pertinent art, then an obviousness determination is as
simple as connecting the dots."' 174 It appears that the Federal
Circuit is saying that when they have concluded that two types of
art address a similar problem, there is an inherent reason to
combine them, without regard to whether there is an obvious
reason to do so.
Of course, it should be noted that the Federal Circuit explained
the connection between Teague's invention and Icon's invention
by showing that both inventions used the spring in similar ways. 175
This sounds like the risk of hindsight bias coming into play yet
again. When looking at the invention next to the prior art, it is
easy to draw the conclusion that it would have been obvious to
combine the Damak invention with the Teague invention. But it is
not necessarily true that when two different inventions use an
element in a similar way that it must have been obvious to
combine one of them with an existing invention. This analysis
removes any credit to the inventor for realizing a novel application
of existing technology. Additionally, IP attorney Steve Sereboff
reported that "examiners can make a prima facie case of
obviousness simply by showing that all of the elements in the
claim are known."' 176 This is not to say that Icon's patent was
necessarily a novel invention and deserving of patent protection.
But the analysis of the Federal Circuit post KSR and without the
TSM test takes on an overly conclusory theme without a detailed
investigation into whether it was truly obvious for a treadmill to
have a gas powered spring to retain the treadmill. If it was so
obvious, wouldn't Damak have thought to include one?
Given the Federal Circuit's decision in In re ICON, it appears
that the Federal Circuit has traded one rigid test for another.
Instead of requiring a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine the prior art references in order to find an invention
obvious, the Federal Circuit now looks to whether reasonably
pertinent art contains all of the elements of the invention. If the
prior art is reasonably pertinent, it "goes a long way" to finding a
173. Id. at 1380 (emphasis added).
174. See Patently-O, supra note 161.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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reason to combine the references and thus the invention was
obvious. This is surely not the flexible approach the Supreme
Court desired after their decision in KSR. Perhaps this new
approach is simply in response to the Supreme Court's desire for
uniformity. It is possible that the Supreme Court actually desired a
uniformly flexible approach to the obvious question, but defining
such an approach could prove more difficult than defining what is
simply obvious.
The Federal Circuit is likely concerned with predictability more
than flexibility, and given the Supreme Court's desire for both, the
Federal Circuit may have chosen the lesser of two evils when it
comes to determining patentability. As previously stated, the cost
This high cost limits the
of prosecuting patents is high.
availability of the patent system to inventors with sufficient
resources to go through the process of arguing with the patent
office. An unpredictable system would further widen the gap
between the haves and have-nots in the technological world,
limiting the patent system to large entities having an already large
patent portfolio. The idea of the one man inventor would, die a
quick death without some sort of ability on his part to predict
whether investing in the patent system would give him a return on
his investment in the form of exclusive rights to his discovery.
E. The Added Uncertainty Caused by the Supreme Court May
Increase Inventors' Willingness to Protect Their Discoveries by
Using Trade Secrets.
Given the larger gamble by the inventor when investing in an
unclear patent system, the inventor may choose alternate ways of
securing the exclusive right to his technology. One alternative to
the patent system is protecting an invention by keeping it a trade
secret. This alternative is not preferable to an inventor or the
public as a whole. The patent system is essentially a contract
between the inventor and the public, where the inventor receives
the exclusive right to make and use his discovery and, in return,
the public is made aware of the discovery and in turn the public
can research and improve on the invention to the benefit of society
as a whole. If an inventor keeps his discovery a secret, the public
does not benefit. While the inventor is still able to use his
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invention and make money off of his discovery, there is still the
risk that someone else will discover the same invention at a later
date. If this occurs, the value of the discovery to the initial
inventor is lower. But without some way to predict whether or not
his invention will be declared obvious, the trade secret route may
be more attractive than the expensive, prolonged process of patent
prosecution coupled with the risk of coming away with nothing.
And not to be forgotten, in addition to the time and money lost on
a failed patent application, the inventor has also lost the secret of
his discovery by disclosing it publicly.
The Federal Circuit seems quite aware of this dilemma, and
appears to have chosen the route of predictability over the idea of
flexibility. Instead of having a predictable test requiring a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine in order to find a
patent obvious, the Federal Circuit now has a rigid predictable test
where if every element of an invention exists in various prior art,
and the prior art is reasonably pertinent to the problem solved by
the invention, the invention is obvious. The Federal Circuit has
traded a test more likely to grant a patent for a test highly likely to
reject a patent. Perhaps this was the desire of the Supreme Court
all along.
But if the industry has to choose between erring by granting
more patents and erring by granting less patents, is granting more
patents the worse result? The inventor of an arguably obvious
invention is still the first person to discover a new and useful
utilization of the technology. If an invention solves a problem,
why should the inventor be punished when extensive hindsight
review reveals that the components of the invention existed
elsewhere in similar art? The art was dissimilar enough to prevent
others from discovering the new use. These discoveries benefit
society to the extent that without them, society would not have the
use of the more efficient technology. Removing patent protection
from these borderline cases only serves to chill the ambition of
inventors who work to improve existing technology. It is true that
granting too many patents could remove from society obvious
combinations of existing inventions that society may already be
using. But the patent act prohibits granting patents for technology
that is already in public use. The danger of taking these inventions
from the public is minimal. The Supreme Court was likely swayed
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/3
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by the invention before them in KSR when they rejected the
Federal Circuit's use of the TSM test. The combination of the
modular sensor with an adjustable pedal certainly appears to have
been obvious, given the myriad patents already disclosing
extremely similar technology, but that did not justify rejecting a
process that was capable of determining the obvious question in a
fair and predictable manner.
The rejection of the Federal Circuit's TSM test is likely to bring
the obviousness question back to the Supreme Court before long.
The TSM test was a response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Graham. The Graham test was ambiguous and unworkable, and
this ambiguity was the likely reason the Federal Circuit created the
TSM test. The Graham test did not function as anticipated by the
Supreme Court in the past, and there is no indication that it is
likely to function properly in the future. As the In re ICON case
shows, the Federal Circuit is not afraid to create rigid tests in order
to create predictability in the industry. This new "all elements"
test is likely to lead to a more egregious failure to properly
investigate whether a claimed invention was truly obvious. The
courts need only to decide that prior art is reasonably pertinent to
the problem to be solved. Once this conclusory determination is
made, concluding that it would be obvious to combine elements
from one with the elements of another is a small step.
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court erred when it rejected the Federal Circuit's
TSM test. Instead of having a workable, predictable, and uniform
test for determining the obviousness question, the industry is left
with an ambiguous mandate of the Supreme Court to resort more
often to common sense. The Supreme Court failed to adequately
examine the Federal Circuit's TSM test to determine whether the
test complied with Supreme Court precedent. Rather, the Court
was swayed by hindsight bias and the particular invention before
them in concluding that the approach of the Federal Circuit was
wrong. The result of the Supreme Court's decision is a likely
return to ambiguity in the near future with regard to the
obviousness question. As a result, the Federal Circuit is likely to
develop a new test to resolve that ambiguity. When that happens,
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

31

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

324

DEPAULJ ART, TECH. &IPLAW

[Vol. XVIII:293

the Supreme Court will likely be pushed into service once again to
review to the state of obviousness jurisprudence. Perhaps then the
Court will investigate further the benefits of a workable test such
as the one recently rejected.
Nicholas Angelocci
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